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Evaluative conditioning (EC) refers to a change in liking of a conditioned stimulus 
(CS) subsequent to its repeated pairing with a valent stimulus (US). Two studies that bring 
new light on the highly debated question of the role of awareness in EC were conducted. We 
developed an innovative method motivated by higher order and integration theories of 
consciousness to distinguish between the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge about 
the pairings. On each trial of the awareness test, participants had to indicate the valence of the 
US associated with a given CS and to make a ‘structural knowledge attribution’ by reporting 
the basis of their response. Valence identification accuracy was used to evaluate knowledge 
while the knowledge attribution was used to measure the conscious status of knowledge. 
Memory attribution indicated conscious knowledge about the pairings while feeling-based 
and random attributions indicated unconscious knowledge. A meta-analysis of the two studies 
revealed that valence identification accuracy was above chance level for memory and feeling-
based attributions but not for the random attribution. EC was found in the three attributions. 
While EC effect size was medium for the memory attribution it was small for feeling-based 
and random attributions. Moreover, Experiment 2 included a delayed test. EC was still present 
24 hours after the conditioning took place. The results obtained for memory and feeling-based 
attributions suggest that both conscious and unconscious knowledge may underlie EC. The 
results obtained for random attribution suggest that EC may also occur without any 
knowledge of US valence. 
Keywords: evaluative conditioning, contingency awareness, conscious knowledge, 




Distinguishing the role of conscious and unconscious knowledge in Evaluative 
Conditioning 
One of the most basic mechanisms by which attitudes (i.e., our likes and dislikes) may 
be formed or changed is evaluative conditioning (EC). EC is based on a very simple 
procedure in which a conditioned stimulus (CS) is repeatedly presented in close spatio-
temporal contiguity with an unconditioned stimulus (US) of either positive or negative 
valence. An EC effect is demonstrated if the attitude toward the CS changes in the direction of 
the US valence.  This effect has been replicated many times (Hofmann, De Houwer, Perugini, 
Baeyens, & Crombez, 2010). However, the role of awareness in EC remains highly debated. 
While some studies suggest that EC only occurs when the subject is consciously aware of the 
CS-US contingencies, others support the opposite conclusion (Sweldens, Corneille & 
Yzerbyt, 2014). 
The theoretical debate has essentially focused on the role of awareness of the CS-US 
contingencies during the conditioning phase, in other words during the encoding of the 
information (Corneille & Stahl, 2018). Experiments that have addressed this question in the 
most direct way manipulated awareness during the conditioning phase. For example, 
experiments used subliminal presentation of stimuli. Some of these studies support the view 
that awareness of stimuli is not required for EC to occur (e.g., Dijksterhuis, 2004;  Field & 
Moore, 2005). However, they have been criticized on methodological grounds and their 
conclusions have been challenged empirically (Stahl, Haaf, & Corneille, 2016; Stahl & 
Bading, 2019). Other studies manipulated cognitive load during the encoding of information 
in order to diminish awareness of the CS-US contingencies.  The results support the view that 
taxing participants’ cognitive resources prevents EC (Dedonder, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & 
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Kuppens, 2010; Mierop, Hütter, & Corneille, 2017; Pleyers, Corneille, Yzerbyt, & Luminet, 
2009) to the extent that the same type of material is used in the conditioning and the 
distracting task (Halbeisen & Walther, 2015). Besides the role of awareness during the 
encoding of information, another theoretical question is the one of the awareness of the CS-
US associations after the conditioning phase, when the subject is subsequently asked to 
evaluate the CS. Few studies have attempted to answer it directly (Gast, De Houwer, & De 
Schryver, 2012; Halbeisen, Blask, Weil, & Walther, 2014). The current paper will focus on 
this last question. 
Awareness during encoding and during CS evaluation are two different things. As 
pointed out by Gawronski and Walther (2012), measurements of awareness made after the 
conditioning phase remain ambiguous about the role of awareness during encoding. Similarly, 
awareness during encoding does not necessarily imply awareness during CS evaluation.  For 
example, a person may be perceptually aware of a given CS and a given US or even be aware 
that they are presented contiguously at the time they are displayed. However, when 
subsequently evaluating the CS, he or she may be unaware that the CS has been repeatedly 
paired with the US. For this reason, we relied on a measure taken at the time of testing to 
study the role of awareness during CS evaluation. A recent account of EC (Gast, 2018) 
postulates that the vast majority of EC effects depend on the awareness of the relation 
between CS and US valence during attitude expression. In this view, awareness during the 
conditioning phase is only a prerequisite. It is thus important to test whether, at the time of CS 
evaluation, EC is exclusively sustained by conscious knowledge or whether unconscious 
knowledge about the pairings may also give rise to EC effects.  
Several methods have been used to measure awareness after the conditioning phase.  It 
has recently been proposed that awareness should be measured for each pair rather than for 
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each participant as a given participant is unlikely to be aware of either all or none of the CS–
US pairings (Pleyers, Corneille, Luminet, & Yzerbyt, 2007). In these studies, a participant 
was considered as aware of a given association when he was able to identify the US 
associated with the CS and as unaware when he did not select the correct US. Stahl, 
Unkelbach and Corneille (2009) refined this method in order to measure the awareness of US 
valence. Their results suggest that awareness of US valence is crucial while US identity does 
not further contribute to EC.  It is thus important to measure awareness of US valence 
(Sweldens et al., 2014). These are objective measures of awareness, as any correct 
identification of the US or of its valence is assumed to be based on conscious knowledge, 
regardless of the subjective experience of the participant. They have been criticized because 
participants may identify US identity or its valence on the basis of their attitude toward CS 
which may skew awareness measurement (we will come back to this question in Experiment 
2) or because unintended retrieval processes may lead to US identification (Hütter, Sweldens, 
Stahl, Unkelbach & Klauer, 2012; Halbeisen et al., 2014). The present studies differentiate 
from these last two approaches because rather than focusing on the role of retrieval processes 
they seek to assess the conscious status of knowledge itself, namely the awareness of 
knowing. To do so, we introduced a novel subjective measure of awareness (Wierzchoń, 
Asanowicz, Paulewicz & Cleeremans, 2012; Wierzchoń, Paulewicz, Asanowicz, 
Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2014).  
 Any measure of awareness presupposes a theory (Dienes & Seth, 2010, 2018). The use 
of objective measures relies on the assumption that there is a perfect overlap between 
performance and awareness (Timmermans & Cleeremans, 2015). However, there is 
considerable evidence showing that a person can report she is guessing while having a 
performance well above baseline (e.g., Dienes, 2012). Hence, from the subject point of view 
there may be a dissociation between awareness and performance. Subjective measures are 
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designed to capture this dissociation. Those measures are motivated by global workspace (and 
other integration theories) and higher order theories (Rosenthal, 2005; Michel et al., 2018) 
which are the dominant theories of consciousness amongst psychologists, neuroscientists and 
other researchers in the field. According to global workspace theory (Baars, 1993; Dehaene, 
Changeux, & Naccache, 2011) information becomes conscious when it enters a ‘global 
workspace’ that broadcasts it to many processors in the brain. As a result, information 
becomes widely available to many cognitive processes and can be used flexibly. For example, 
one can exert voluntary control over conscious content or report it while it is not the case for 
unconscious content.  Higher order theory of consciousness relies on another characteristic 
associated with consciousness to differentiate conscious form unconscious contents. By this 
theory, one has to have a meta-representation of having a mental content (i.e., a higher order 
state) to be aware of that content. In other words, one has to be aware of knowing. If 
information is in the global workspace, it is thereby available to mechanisms that produce 
higher order states. A first order state is just about the world; it allows discriminations about 
the world. Unconscious knowledge would be an example of such a state. A second order state 
has content about mental states; the second order states specifically relevant to consciousness 
assert one is in a lower order state. Thus, on the global workspace and higher order theories, 
the conscious status of mental states is revealed by the ability of people to tell they are in that 
state (seeing, knowing, etc.).  For example, the ability to indicate the valence of the US paired 
with a given CS may be based on either conscious or unconscious knowledge. For the 
knowledge to be considered as conscious subjects must be aware that they know the valence 
of the US. We developed a subjective measure of the conscious status of knowledge in the EC 
paradigm motivated by the higher order and global workspace theories of consciousness. 
In addition of asking participants to indicate the valence of the US associated with 
each CS as in previous research (e.g., Pleyers et al., 2007), we asked them if they remembered 
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having seen this CS presented with either a positive or a negative US. This allows us to test 
for awareness of knowing. Above chance level identification is regarded as based on 
conscious knowledge if the participant reports remembering having seen the pairs. In contrast, 
above chance level identification is regarded as based on unconscious knowledge if the 
participant reports that he doesn’t remember having seen the pairs. This type of subjective 
measure has been used in various implicit learning paradigms, and these studies are the first to 
adapt it to a classical EC paradigm. 
Subjective measures of awareness in implicit learning 
Dienes and Scott (2005) introduce this way of measuring the conscious status of 
knowledge in artificial grammar learning. In this paradigm, after incidental exposure to 
apparently random strings of letters, participants classify new strings as obeying or violating a 
set of rules. For each classification they are asked to indicate the basis of their response 
(random guessing, intuition, familiarity, conscious rules or memory). Experiments using this 
method demonstrated that classification of the test strings was above chance level not only 
when participants made memory and rules attributions (which indicates conscious knowledge 
of the structure of the material) but also when they made intuition, familiarity or guessing 
attributions (which indicates unconscious structural knowledge) (e.g., Scott & Dienes, 2008; 
see Dienes, 2012, for a review).  
The same kind of results using the structural knowledge attributions have been 
obtained not only with artificial grammar learning (e.g. Ivanchei, & Moroshkina, 2018; 
Jurchiş, & Opre, 2016), but also with other implicit learning paradigms, such as sequence 
learning (e.g. Fu, Dienes & Fu, 2010), symmetry learning (e.g. Jiang,  Zhu, Guo, Ma, Yang & 
Dienes, 2012; Ling et al, 2018), second language learning (e.g. Paciorek & Williams, 2015; 
Rebuschat, 2013; Rogers, Revesz, & Rebuschat, 2016), probabilistic category learning (e.g., 
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Kemény & Lukács, 2013), learning conjunctive rule sets (Neil & Higham, 2012), and learning 
multiple grammars (Wan, Dienes, & Fu, 2008; Norman, Scott, Price, Jones, & Dienes, in 
press). Hence, participants may acquire knowledge that they are aware of as well as 
knowledge that they are not aware of in various implicit learning paradigms. We will be the 
first to adapt structural knowledge attributions to a classical EC paradigm. 
Overview of the experiments 
EC is one of the simplest incidental learning paradigms. Participants are incidentally 
exposed to pairs of stimuli and learn the structure of this material (i.e., the CS-US pairings) 
presumably without full awareness of what has been learned. We thus adapted Dienes and 
Scott’s (2005) attribution method to test for the awareness of what has been learned. To do so, 
we designed a valence awareness test in which participants were first asked to indicate the 
valence of the US associated with a given CS. This forced choice served as an objective 
measure of US valence awareness. In addition, we took a subjective measure of awareness by 
asking participants to report the basis of their response. They could make a memory 
attribution by reporting that they responded positive or negative because they remembered 
having seen the CS presented with a positive or a negative picture. They could make a 
feeling-based attribution by reporting that they did not remember with which picture the CS 
had been presented and that their response was based on an intuition or a feeling of 
familiarity. They could make a random attribution by reporting that they responded 
completely randomly, and that they don’t have any confidence in their response. 
We relied on the valence identification task to evaluate whether performance was 
above chance in each attribution. Provided that this is the case, by making a memory 
attribution, participants indicate that their knowledge about the structure of the pairings (i.e., 
their structural knowledge) is conscious as they are aware of the basis of their responses. By 
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contrast, the other types of attributions indicate that the structural knowledge is unconscious 
as participants are not aware of the basis of their responses. Besides the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious structural knowledge, the knowledge attributions also allow 
distinguishing between conscious and unconscious judgement knowledge. In the current task, 
judgement knowledge refers to the knowledge about the accuracy of the responses on the 
valence identification test. A memory attribution indicates that both judgment and structural 
knowledge are conscious (i.e., “I have some confidence in my response, and I know why”).  A 
feeling-based attribution indicates that judgment knowledge is conscious and structural 
knowledge unconscious (i.e., “I have some confidence in my response, but I don’t know 
why”). Finally, a random attribution indicates that both structural and judgment knowledge 
are unconscious (i.e., “I don’t have any confidence in my response, and I don’t know why I 
responded like this”).   
We conducted two studies based on using structural knowledge attributions which 
allowed us to examine not only whether correct valence identification is necessary for EC to 
occur, but also whether correct identification is necessarily based on conscious knowledge 
about the pairings.  This new method brings new light on the question of awareness which is 
central in characterizing the nature of EC.  
As conscious and unconscious structural knowledge may be acquired in various 
implicit or incidental learning paradigms (Dienes, 2012), we expected that US valence 
identifications (i.e., structural knowledge) would be above chance level in all attributions. 
First-order knowledge about the world enables appropriate engagement with the world. 
Awareness of structural knowledge requires a second order state, with content that one has 
that structural knowledge; but such content gives no additional information for actually acting 
on the world (Dienes, 2012). On this analysis, EC effects should obtain whether the 
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knowledge about the pairings is conscious or unconscious. Hence, EC should obtain for the 
memory attribution (i.e., conscious structural knowledge) as well as for the feeling-based 
(intuition and familiarity) and random attributions (i.e., unconscious structural knowledge). 
Besides these main analyses, we also examined whether US valence identification moderates 
EC (as it was done in previous research). Because representations of the link between CS and 
US valence (i.e. structural knowledge) would allow both valence identification and EC, 
valence identification should moderate EC. More specifically, on this analysis, an EC effect 
should obtain only when US valence has been correctly identified. 
Experiment 1 
Effect size and statistical power 
On the basis of the mean EC effect size (Cohen's d = .52) obtained in the most recent 
meta-analysis (Hofmann et al., 2010), a power analysis indicated that 51 participants would 
be needed to achieve a 95% power (G*Power; Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009). We 
systematically collected larger samples to accommodate for potential data loss (e.g., all 
participants might not use all attributions). The power analysis is used to legitimate 
frequentist decisions by the reader, bearing in mind the Type II error rate is controlled only 
with respect to the average previously obtained relevant effect size. In fact, we will be making 
decisions with reference to Bayes factors. 
Participants and design 
Eighty-seven Clermont Auvergne University students (Mage =19.60; SDage = 1.47; 69 
females) took part in the experiment. All participants were native French speakers and gave 
their written informed consent to participate. They received course credits in return for their 
participation. The ethic committee of Clermont Auvergne University approved the ethic 
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applications for Experiments 1 and 2 (approval number: 2016-CE04). The design of the study 
included US valence (positive vs. negative) and time of measurement (preratings vs. 
postratings) as within-subjects factors.  
Materials 
A set of 60 black-and-white pictures of human faces (30 females, 30 males) was used 
as the CS repertory (Hütter & Sweldens, 2013; Lundqvist, Flykt & Öhman, 1998). For each 
participant, CS were selected from that pool based on an initial evaluative rating. Twenty 
pleasant and 20 unpleasant pictures from the International Affective Picture System (Lang, 
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) served as US. CS and IAPS numbers of US are available on the 
Open Science Framework 
(https://osf.io/unbem/?view_only=3d240471cec448d1984f96ad145a3fbc). 
Procedure 
Participants were first asked to rate the extent to which they liked 60 faces on a 
continuous scale with the endpoints “not at all” and “enormously”, converted into a 400-point 
scale. They were asked to rate each face within 10 seconds. If they exceeded this time-limit 
they were simply asked to hurry up. For each participant, 40 faces with a medium rating were 
selected as CS. Before the conditioning phase, participants were instructed to look at the 
pictures that would be presented and to press the space bar when a fixation cross was 
presented.  In the subsequent conditioning phase, each US was randomly paired with one of 
the selected CS. The conditioning phase consisted of 6 presentation blocks. In each 
presentation block, the 40 CS-US pairs were presented simultaneously for 1500 ms in a 
random order with an interstimulus interval of 100 ms. For half of the presentation blocks, CS 
were displayed to the right of the US and for the other half they were displayed to the left.  In 
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addition to the CS-US pairs, 4 fixation crosses were displayed in random order within each 
block. After the conditioning phase, participants were given explanations concerning the next 
phase of the experiment. The following instructions were displayed:  
You will answer to 40 series of three questions. 1) You will first rate to what extent you like a 
face. 2)  During the previous phase of the experiment each face has been presented several 
times together with a positive or negative picture. A face will be presented anew. You will 
have to try to remember the picture that has been paired with this face to answer the following 
question: Was the picture paired with this face positive or negative? 3) You will then answer 
the following question: “What is the basis of your answer to the previous question?” – My 
memory: I have chosen positive/negative because I remember that this face has been 
presented at the same time as a positive/negative picture. – An intuition: I don’t remember 
with which picture this face has been presented.  However, I have some confidence in my 
response, but I could not explain why. – A feeling of familiarity: I don’t remember with 
which picture this face has been presented. However, I have the feeling that this face was 
associated with something positive/negative, but I don’t know where it comes from. – I 
responded totally randomly: I don’t have any confidence in my answer. 
After confirming that they had understood the instructions, participants started the test 
phase. The test phase comprised 40 series of three questions: an evaluation question, a 
valence identification and an attribution question. Participants were given 10 seconds to rate 
each face. The US identification and attribution questions were displayed on the same screen. 
Participants were given 20 s to answer both questions. If they exceeded this time-limit, they 
were simply asked to hurry up. Hence, the measurement of US valence awareness was made 
immediately after evaluative ratings to avoid any forgetting (Berry & Dienes, 1993; Shanks & 
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St. John, 1994). At the end of the experiment, they provided demographic information, were 
thanked and debriefed. 
Data analysis 
The data of the two experiments are available on the Open Science Framework at 
https://osf.io/unbem/?view_only=3d240471cec448d1984f96ad145a3fbc. 
Bayes factors (B) were used to assess strength of evidence (Wagenmakers et 
al., 2017). Unlike null-hypothesis significance testing, Bayes factors have the advantage of 
distinguishing sensitive evidence for H0 from insensitive evidence (which is little or no 
evidence for or against a hypothesis). A B of above 3 indicates substantial evidence for the 
alternative over the null hypothesis and below 1/3 substantial evidence for the null over the 
alternative hypothesis. Bs between 3 and 1/3 indicate data insensitivity in distinguishing null 
and alternative hypotheses (Dienes, 2014; Jeffreys, 1939; Lee & Wagenmakers, 2013).  
Here, BH(0, x) refers to a Bayes factor in which the predictions of H1 were modelled as 
half-normal distribution with an SD of x (Dienes 2014). The half-normal distribution can be 
used when a theory makes a directional prediction where x scales the size of effect that could 
be expected (so x can be chosen from relevant past studies; or it can be set to half of a 
plausible maximum effect). 
We now describe how we modelled H1 for our tests. The expected scale of effect, x, 
cannot be set by the actual difference being tested but must be derived otherwise. Other 
aspects of the same data may constrain plausible values of the effect (e.g. the size of an effect 
overall may constrain how much that effect could be expected to be modified) (Dienes, 2019).  
For the effect of evaluative conditioning on liking, the average effect from three 
previous papers using a similar paradigm to us was 23.5 liking units (when expressed on our 
400 point scale) (Hütter & Sweldens, 2013; Hütter et al. 2012, study 2a, 2b and 3; and Mierop 
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et al. 2017, study 1, 2, 3 control condition). Note we only need a rough indication of the 
expected effect size, as the model of H1 indicates any value between 0 and twice the expected 
value as plausible. Thus, H1 for liking change was modelled as a half-normal with SD = 23.5 
liking units. When analysing data regardless of US valence identification accuracy and when 
only considering CS for which the correct US valence was identified, we only tested H1. As 
incorrect knowledge might lead to reverse EC effects we also modelled a H2. While H1 refers 
to Bayes factors testing the hypothesis that positively paired CS will be evaluated more 
positively than negatively paired CS, H2 refers to Bayes factors testing the opposite 
hypothesis according to which positively paired CS will be evaluated more negatively than 
negatively paired CS. When participants indicated the wrong US valence, we tested H1 as 
well as H2. H2 for liking change was modelled as a half-normal with SD = 23.5 in the 
opposite direction. 
For valence identification, Stahl et al. (2009 exp 1) using a somewhat similar EC 
paradigm found percent correct classification as about 15% above baseline. Thus, for 
identification accuracy we used SD = 15%. 
To indicate the robustness of Bayesian conclusions, for each B, a robustness region is 
reported, giving the range of scales that qualitatively support a given conclusion (i.e. evidence 
as insensitive, or as supporting H0, or as supporting H1), notated as: Rob. Reg. [x1, x2] where 
x1 is the smallest SD that supports the conclusion and x2 is the largest. 
Results 
Number of attributions of each type 
Table 1 shows the mean number of trials attributed to memory, feelings or random 
guessing. Participants reported conscious structural knowledge (i.e., knowledge about the 
structure of the pairings) and conscious judgment knowledge (e.g., having some confidence in 
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the response) by responding memory. Intuition and familiarity attributions were pooled into a 
‘feeling-based’ attribution because in each of these attributions, participants reported 
unconscious structural knowledge and conscious judgment knowledge (Mealor & Dienes, 
2012). Provided above chance performance at the valence identification test, random selection 
responses would reflect instances where both structural and judgment knowledge are 
unconscious.  
Table 1  
Number of trials (out of forty) attributed to each response type. Standard deviations appear in 
parentheses. 
 Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 2 Follow-up 
Memory 13.89 (6.61) 11.93 (6.08) 9.55 (6.22) 
Feeling-based 17.05 (5.91) 12.88 (6.99) 13.09 (6.11) 
Evaluation n.a. 8.25 (5.30) 9.41 (6.79) 
Random 9.06 (5.55) 6.95 (4.76) 7.94 (6.93) 
US valence identification 
As can be seen in Table 2, there was decisive evidence that the proportion of correct 
responses at the US valence identification test was higher than chance overall, t(86) = 11.18, p 
< .001,  BH(0, 15% above H0) = 1.48 × 10
26, Rob. Reg. [0.10, >100%], Cohen’s d = 1.20, and for 
memory attributions, t(86) = 15.25, p < .001, BH(0, 15%) = 1.25 × 10
49, Rob. Reg. [0.13, 
>100%], Cohen’s d = 1.63. Similarly, the evidence for above chance performance was strong 
for feeling-based attributions, t(86) = 3.45, p < .001, BH(0, 15%) = 73.85, Rob. Reg. [0.52, 
>100%], Cohen’s d = .37. By contrast, there was substantial evidence for chance performance 
for random attributions, t(86) = -.147, p = .88, BH(0, 15%) = 0.14, Rob. Reg. [5.84, ∞], Cohen’s 
d = -.016.  Hence participants acquired both conscious and unconscious structural knowledge 
as they performed above chance for memory and feeling-based attributions. However, they 
did not acquire any structural knowledge in trials attributed to random. 
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Table 2  
Proportion of correct responses at the US valence identification test for each response type. 
 Exp 1. Exp 2. Exp 2. Follow-up 
 M SD n M SD n M SD n 
Overall .62 .10 87 .58  .08 57 .58 .08 56 
Memory .79  .18 87 .78 .16 55 .82  .17 53 
Feeling-based .55 .14 87 .53  .15 56 .53  .15 54 
Evaluation n.a. n.a. n.a. .51  .22 56 .51  .17 53 
Random .50 .22 87 .50  .21 51 .50  .23 49 
Note. Chance level = .50. 
EC effects 
We first computed the difference between preratings and postratings for positively and 
negatively paired CS. This served as an index of attitude change. We then conducted repeated 
measures ANOVAs comparing attitude change in positively paired and in negatively paired 
CS to examine EC effects. We first report the results overall and for each knowledge 
attribution. Next, we tested whether US valence identification moderates EC and reported 
results for CS for which US valence was correctly identified and for CS for which US valence 
was not correctly identified. 
The comparison between attitude change in positively paired and negatively paired CS 
provided decisive evidence for a general EC effect, F(1,86) = 34.88, p < .001, BH1(0, 23.5 liking 
units) = 6.41 × 10
6, Rob. Reg. [0.5, >400], partial η2 = .289. The mean difference between 
attitude change for positively and negatively paired CS can be seen in Figure 1. Next, we 
examined EC effects separately for each knowledge attribution. We found decisive evidence 
for an EC effect for memory attributions, F(1,84) = 39.70, p < .001, BH1(0, 23.5) = 7.35 × 10
7, 
Rob. Reg. [0.84, >400], partial η2 = .321, substantial evidence for feeling-based attributions, 
F(1,85) = 5.20, p = .025, BH1(0, 23.5) = 3.25, Rob. Reg. [1.81, 25.6], partial η
2 = .058, but no 
evidence one way or the other for random attributions, F(1,83) = 1.60, p = .21, 
BH1(0, 23.5) = 0.65, Rob. Reg. [0, 46.9] partial η
2 = .019. Finally, to test whether EC may occur 
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in the absence of conscious structural knowledge, we also grouped feeling-based and random 
attributions into a ‘no conscious structural knowledge’ category. This analysis yielded 
substantial evidence for an EC effect, F(1,84) = 8.09, p < .01, BH1(0, 23.5) = 9.31, Rob. Reg. 
[0.86, 75.3], partial η2 = .087. 
In order to replicate previous findings (e.g., Halbeisen et al., 2014; Pleyers et al., 2007; 
2009), we tested whether US valence identification moderated EC. We ran a two (US 
valence) by two (accuracy of US valence identification) ANOVA. This analysis provided 
decisive evidence that US valence identification moderated EC, F(1,86) = 77.79, p < .001, 
BH1(0, 23.5) = 3.09 × 10
15, Rob. Reg. [0.76, >800], partial η2 = .475. There was decisive 
evidence for an EC effect for CS for which US valence was correctly identified (Mdiff = 34.9, 
95%CI = [ 26.7; 48.1]), F(1,86) = 71.34, p < .001, BH1(0, 23.5) = 3.80 × 10
4, Rob. Reg. [0.53, 
>400], partial η2 = .453. By contrast, there was decisive evidence for a reversed EC effect 
when US valence was not identified, F(1,86) = 44.87, p < .001, BH1(0, 23.5) = 0.017, Rob. Reg. 
[0.89, ∞], BH2(0, 23.5) = 1.06 × 10
9, Rob. Reg. [0.49, >400], partial η2 = .343. In this case, the 
mean difference between attitude change for positively and negatively paired CS was negative 




Figure 1. Mean difference between attitude change for positively and negatively paired CS in 
as a function of attribution type. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. 
Discussion 
The conditioning procedure yielded a large general EC effect. A large EC effect and a 
high proportion of correct US valence identifications was obtained for the memory 
attribution; and there was also an EC effect and above chance proportion of correct US 
valence identifications for the feeling-based attribution. As far as the random attribution is 
concerned US valence identification accuracy was at chance and there was no evidence one 
way or the other for the EC effect. Grouping feeling-based and random attributions into a ‘no 
conscious structural knowledge’ category yielded substantial evidence for EC. Moreover, 
additional analyses revealed that US valence identification moderated the general EC effect. 
More specifically, while large EC effects was obtained among CS for which US valence had 




Our hypothesis that US valence identification would be above chance level and EC 
would occur in each attribution was supported for memory and feeling-attributions but not for 
the random attribution. Hence, for the two former attributions, participants acquired some 
knowledge about the structure of the associations. By making memory attributions they 
reported that this structural knowledge was conscious while they reported that it was 
unconscious by making feeling-based attributions. Hence, the results suggest that both 
conscious and unconscious structural knowledge may underlie EC. At the subjective 
threshold, awareness does not seem necessary for EC to occur as participants acquired both 
knowledge that they were aware of and knowledge that they were not aware of. 
Additional analyses also replicated previous findings (Halbeisen et al., 2014; Pleyers 
et al., 2007; 2009) that US valence identification moderates EC and that EC effects are only 
obtained among CS for which US valence can be identified. In other words, awareness, 
measured at the objective threshold, seems necessary for EC to occur.  Reversed EC effects 
were found when US valence had not been correctly identified. These effects might seem 
surprising at first sight. However, several recent studies that distinguished between CS for 
which US valence had been correctly or incorrectly identified found similar effects (Förderer 
& Unkelbach, 2013; Stahl & Unkelbach, 2009; Halbeisen et al., 2014). As suggested by 
Halbeisen and colleagues (2014), false memory of the US could be responsible for these 
effects. Participants could, in some cases, experience phantom recollection of a wrong US 
when they made an incorrect response or when they evaluate CS (Brainerd, Payne, Wright & 
Reyna, 2003).   
Participants could also have based their responses at the valence identification test on 
their attitudes toward CS (Hütter et al., 2012, but see Mierop et al., 2017). This might have 
contributed to the finding that EC effects were found for correct US identifications while 
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reversed EC effects were found for incorrect valence identifications. In this first experiment, 
US valence identification immediately followed CS evaluation. This procedure minimizes any 
forgetting that might have led to underestimate awareness (Shanks & St. John, 1994). 
However, this procedure might have strengthened the tendency to respond to memory 
questions on the basis of attitudes. Hütter et al. (2012) suggested that conditioned attitudes, 
acquired in the absence of memory of US valence, could lead to indicate the correct US 
valence which would in turn lead to overestimate contingency awareness and underestimate 
unaware EC (at the objective threshold). Furthermore, when pre-existing attitudes toward CS 
happen to be congruent with US valence in the absence of genuine conditioning (e.g., because 
all CS are not perfectly neutral for each participant), US valence could be correctly identified 
if participants rely on affect-as-information (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) which would lead to 
overestimate EC among correct identifications.  Conversely, if pre-existing attitudes toward 
CS are incongruent with US valence, participants could often indicate the wrong valence 
which could lead to reversed EC effects (Bar-Anan, De Houwer & Nosek, 2010). However, 
because we measured attitude change rather than only measuring attitudes after conditioning, 
this last phenomenon should be reduced in the present study.  Moreover, we conducted an 
additional analysis and found a very weak correlation between pre-existing attitudes and 
valence identification. The evidence against the existence of a correlation was insensitive 
(r(86) = 0.055, BF = 0.34, Rob. Reg. [0, 0.34])1.  
Experiment 2 
The goal of experiment 2 was to replicate the finding of Experiment 1. A few changes 
were made to the procedure in order to deal with the limitations of Study 1. In Study 2, 
participants evaluated all CS before performing the US valence identification task.  Moreover, 
we added an evaluation attribution.  Hence participants could report that they relied on their 
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attitude toward CS to answer the valence identification questions (Hütter et al., 2012). These 
modifications allow us to reduce and evaluate the impact of attitudes on US valence 
identification. Additionally, a follow-up test was administered approximately 24 hours after 
the first phase of the experiment. On the basis of previous research, we expected EC to be 
robust over this time delay (Grossman & Till, 1998; Hütter, et al., 2012). We expected 
valence identification accuracy to decline over time (Wixted & Ebbesen, 1991).  We also 
expected that the number of memory attributions would diminish while the number of other 
types of attributions would increase. 
Participants and design 
Fifty-nine first year Clermont Auvergne University students took part in the 
experiment. All of them were native French speakers and gave their written informed consent 
to participate. They received course credits in return for their participation. Two participants 
were excluded from analyses because they failed to comply with instructions. The final 
sample consisted of 57 participants (Mage =19.12; SDage = 2.70; 50 females) among which one 
did not take part to the follow-up session. The design of the study included US valence 
(positive vs. negative) and time of measurement (preratings vs. postratings vs. follow-up) as 
within-subject factors.  
Materials 
The material was the same as in Experiment 1. 
Procedure 
The procedure was very similar to that of Experiment 1 except for a few changes. 
Participants rated the same set of sixty faces as in the first part of Experiment 1. However, the 
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CS repertory was composed of a fixed subset of 40 faces. The assignment of the CS to the US 
was counterbalanced across participants (4 versions) rather than randomized anew for each 
participant.  The conditioning phase was similar to that of Experiment 1. The test phase was 
divided in an evaluation and a US valence identification phase. Participants first rated the 40 
CS. They then took part to the valence identification test in which they had to identify the 
valence of the US associated with each CS and to make an attribution for each of their 
responses. As compared to Experiment 1, we added an “evaluation attribution”. The item was 
phrased: “My evaluation of the face: I don’t remember with which picture this face was 
presented. I responded on the basis of my positive or negative feelings toward the face”. The 
experiment also included a follow-up session administered online 24 hours later. During this 
session, participants rated the 40 CS again and then took part to a second valence 
identification test.  
Results 
We first report analyses concerning the first session of the experiment before reporting 
analyses concerning the follow-up session. 
First session 
Number of attributions of each type 
Table 1 shows the mean number of trials attributed to memory, feelings, evaluation or 
random guessing. About eight responses out of forty were attributed to the feelings evoked by 
the CS, the evaluation attribution. Consequently, the sample number of attributions of the 




US valence identification 
As can be seen in Table 2, there was decisive evidence that the proportion of correct 
responses at the US valence identification test was higher than chance overall, t(56) = 7.67, p 
< .001, BH(0, 15% above H0) = 7.45 x 10
11, Rob. Reg. [0.15, >100], Cohen’s d = 1.02, and for the 
memory attribution, t(54) = 12.65, p < .001, BH(0, 15%) = 3.22 x 10
33, Rob. Reg. [0.18, >100], 
Cohen’s d = 1.71.  By contrast there was no evidence one way or the other for the feeling-
based attribution, t(55) = 1.48, p = .14,  BH(0, 15%) =.74, Rob. Reg. [0, 34.2], Cohen’s d = .20, 
and substantial evidence for chance performance for the evaluation, t(55) = .24, p = .81, 
BH(0, 15%) =.23, Rob. Reg. [10.2, ∞], Cohen’s d = .032, and the random attributions, t(50) = -
.09, p = .93, BH(0, 15%) =.19, Rob. Reg. [7.86, ∞], Cohen’s d = -.012.  Hence, the results were 
similar to those of Experiment 1, except that data were insensitive for the feeling-based 
attribution. 
EC effects 
We followed the same analytical strategy as in Experiment 1:  we compared attitude 
change between positively and negatively paired CS. As in Experiment 2, CS-US pairings 
were counterbalanced (rather than randomized), the two variables used to counterbalance the 
assignments were entered in the analyses.  
There was decisive evidence for a general EC effect, F(1,53) = 12.18, p = .001, 
BH1(0, 23.5) = 124, Rob. Reg. [1.20, >400], partial η
2 = .187. The mean difference between 
attitude change for positively and negatively paired CS can be seen in Figure 1. Next, we 
examined EC effects separately for each knowledge attribution. We found strong evidence for 
an EC effect for memory attributions, F(1,47) = 7.39, p = .009, BH1(0, 23.5) = 17.7, Rob. Reg. 
[4.13, 237], partial η2 = .136, insensitive evidence for feeling-based attributions, F(1,51) =  
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1.55, p = .22, BH1(0, 23.5) = .78, Rob. Reg. [0, 58.0], partial η
2 = .029, substantial evidence for 
the null in the evaluation attributions, F(1,42) = .47, p = .50, BH1(0, 23.5) = 0.19, Rob. Reg. 
[12.38, ∞], partial η2 = .011, and strong evidence for an EC effect for random attributions, 
F(1,44) = 9.66, p = .003, BH1(0, 23.5) =  43.0, Rob. Reg. [2.13, >400], partial η
2 = .180. As in 
Experiment 1, we also analysed feeling-based and random attributions together. Again, this 
analysis yielded strong evidence for an EC effect, F(1,53) = 7.00, p < .05, BH1(0, 
23.5) = 10.35, Rob. Reg. [1.98, 90.0], partial η2 = .117. 
Next, we examined whether US valence identification was required for EC. We ran a 
two (US valence) by two (accuracy of US valence identification) ANOVA. This analysis 
provided substantial evidence that US valence identification moderated EC, F(1,52) = 5.92, p 
= .018, BH(0, 23.5) =  8.77, Rob. Reg. [4.00, 92.6], partial η
2 = .102. There was decisive evidence 
for an EC effect among CS for which US valence was correctly identified (Mdiff = 19.7, 
95%CI = [8.28; 31.1]), F(1,52) = 12.02, p = .001, BH1(0, 23.5) =  135, Rob. Reg. [1.91, >400], 
partial η2 = .188. By contrast, there was substantial evidence for an absence of regular EC 
effect (Mdiff = 1.72, 95%CI = [-6.33; -9.77]), F(1,52) = .18, p = .67, BH1(0, 23.5) =  0.25, Rob. 
Reg. [16.9, ∞], partial η2 = .004, and an absence of reversed EC effect, BH2(0, 23.5) = 0.13, Rob. 
Reg. [8.1, ∞], when US valence was not correctly identified.    
Second session 
Number of attributions of each type 
Table 1 shows the mean number of trials attributed to memory, feelings, evaluation or 
random. 
US valence identification 
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As can be seen in Table 2, there was decisive evidence that the proportion of correct 
responses at US valence identification test was higher than chance overall, t(55) = 7.28, p < 
.001, BH(0, 15% above H0) = 3.94 x 10
10 , Rob. Reg. [0.16, >100], Cohen’s d = .97 for the memory 
attribution, t(52) = 13.40, p < .001,  BH(0, 15% above H0) = 3.58 x 10
37 , Rob. Reg. [0.19, >100], 
Cohen’s d = 1.84. There was no evidence one way or the other in the feeling-based 
attribution, t(53) = 1.40, p = .17, BH(0, 15% above H0) = .64 , Rob. Reg. [0, 29.1], Cohen’s d = .19, 
substantial evidence for chance performance for the evaluation attribution, t(52) = .34, p = 
.74, BH(0, 15% above H0) = .21 , Rob. Reg. [9.0, ∞], Cohen’s d = .046, and for the random 
attribution, t(48) = -.12, p = .90, BH(0, 15% above H0) = .19 , Rob. Reg. [8.3, ∞], Cohen’s d = -.018.   
EC effects 
To analyse the data from the follow-up session, we computed attitude change indexes 
by subtracting preratings from ratings made during the follow-up session (i.e., approximately 
24 hours later).  
To examine the general EC effect, we compared attitude change indexes on the whole 
data set.  The mean difference between attitude change for positively and negatively paired 
CS can be seen in Figure 1. There was evidence for an EC effect, F(1,52) = 4.84, p = .032, 
BH1(0, 23.5) =  2.98
2, Rob. Reg. for evidence for H1 [2.3, 23.3], Rob. Reg. for insensitivity [0, 
2.2] & [23.4, 221], partial η2 = .085. Hence, the general EC effect remained present after a 24 
hours delay. Next, we examined EC effects in each knowledge attribution. For the memory 
attribution, we found decisive evidence for an EC effect, F(1,41) = 9.63, p = .003,  
BH1(0, 23.5) =  45.5, Rob. Reg. [3.98, >400], partial η
2 = .190. For the feeling-based, F(1, 50) = 
.01, p = .91, BH1(0, 23.5) = .31, Rob. Reg. [21.2, ∞], partial η
2 = .000, and the evaluation 
attributions, F(1, 39) = .16, p = .69, BH1(0, 23.5) = .31, Rob. Reg. [21.5, ∞], partial η
2 = .004, 
there was substantial evidence for the null. By contrast, there was substantial evidence for an 
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EC effect in the random attribution, F(1, 35) = 4.14, p = .049, BH1(0, 23.5) = 4.09, Rob. Reg. 
[6.23, 38.2], partial η2 = .106. We also analysed feeling-based and random attributions 
together. This analysis yielded no evidence one way or the other, F(1,52) = 0.30, p = .58, 
BH1(0, 23.5) =  0.39, Rob. Reg. [0, 27.6], partial η
2 = .006. 
Next, we analysed whether US valence identification moderated EC. There was 
substantial evidence for an interaction between US valence and the accuracy of US valence 
identification, F(1, 50) = 14.28, p < .001, BH(0, 23.5) = 358, Rob. Reg. [2.75, >800], partial η
2 = 
.222. Decisive evidence for an EC effect was found when US valence was correctly identified 
(Mdiff= 20.1, 95%CI = [9.30; 30.9]), F(1, 51) = 13.99, p < .001,  BH1(0, 23.5) = 338, Rob. Reg. 
[1.65, >400], partial η2 = .215. By contrast, there was strong evidence for a reversed EC effect 
when US valence was not correctly identified, F(1, 50) = 6.73, p = .012, BH1(0, 23.5) =  0.067, 
Rob. Reg. [4.05, ∞], BH2(0, 23.5) = 11.0, Rob. Reg. [2.76, 105], partial η
2 = .119. Indeed, the 
mean difference between attitude change for positively and negatively paired CS was negative 
(Mdiff = -14.6, 95%CI = [ -25.9; -3.27]) when participants failed to identify US valence, which 
indicates a reversed EC effect. 
Comparison between session 1 and follow-up 2 
As can be seen in Table 1, there was decisive evidence for a decrease in the number of 
memory attributions in the follow up session3, t(55) = 4.24, p < .001, BH1(0, 5) = 1455, Rob. 
Reg. [.14, >40], Cohen’s d = .57. There was evidence for the null compared to the hypothesis 
of an increase in the number of feeling-based attribution, t(55) = .00, p = 1, BH2(0, 5) = .15, 
Rob. Reg. [2.20, ∞], Cohen’s d = 0. There was insensitive evidence for an increase in the 
number of evaluation, t(55) = -1.83, p = .073, BH2(0, 5) =  1.17, Rob. Reg. [0, 18.0], Cohen’s d 
= -.25, and random attributions, t(55) = -1.66, p = .10, BH2(0, 5) = 0.96, Rob. Reg. [0, 14.9], 
Cohen’s d = -.22. 
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As can be seen in Table 2, valence identification accuracy did not decrease between 
the first and the follow-up session of the experiment. There was decisive evidence for an 
absence of difference overall, t(55) = .66, p = .51 , BH1(0, 15) = 0.13 , Rob. Reg. [5.46, ∞], 
Cohen’s d = .09, for the memory attribution, t(52) = -1.38, p = .17, BH1(0, 15) = 0.066 , Rob. 
Reg. [2.58, ∞], Cohen’s d = -.19, for the feeling-based attribution, t(53) = -.30, p = .77, 
BH1(0, 15) = 0.13 Rob. Reg. [5.56, ∞], Cohen’s d = -.04, for the evaluation attribution, t(51) = -
.22, p = .83, BH1(0, -15) = 0.22 , Rob. Reg. [9.64, ∞], Cohen’s d = -.03 and for the random 
attribution, t(47) = .20, p = .84, BH1(0, 15) = 0.25 , Rob. Reg. [11.1, ∞], Cohen’s d = .03.  
In order to compare EC effects across the two sessions we computed EC scores for the 
two sessions by subtracting attitude change for negatively paired CS from attitude change for 
positively paired CS. We report B that test the hypothesis that EC was weaker in the second 
session than in the first. 
There was insensitive evidence that the general EC effect was weaker during the 
second session, F(1,52) = 3.39, p = .071, BH1(0, 23.5) = 1.26, Rob. Reg. [0, 91.4], partial η
2 = 
.061.When considering attributions separately, there was substantial evidence for the null in 
the memory, F(1,41) = 0.10, p = .75, BH1(0, 23.5) = 0.25, Rob. Reg. [17.0, ∞], partial η
2 = .003, 
and for the evaluation attributions, F(1,39) = 0.087, p = .77, BH1(0, 23.5) = 0.28, Rob. Reg. [20.0, 
∞], partial η2 = .002.  There was no evidence one way or the other for other attributions. 
Discussion 
The results of Experiment 2 were generally congruent with those of Experiment 1. 
Overall and in the memory attribution the proportion of correct valence identifications was 
substantial and medium to large EC effects were found. In the feeling-based and the random 
attributions, EC effects were also in the same direction as in Experiment 1. However, the 
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evidence for an EC effect was insensitive in the feeling-based attribution while it was large in 
the random attribution. As in the first experiment, grouping feeling-based and random 
attributions yielded strong evidence for EC. As far as valence identification is concerned, the 
pattern of results was also congruent with the previous experiment. There was evidence for 
chance performance in the random attribution. However, there was only insensitive evidence 
for above chance performance in the feeling-based attribution. As EC effects go in the same 
direction in both experiments while strength of evidence sometimes differ, we decided to 
perform a meta-analysis of the two studies to have a better estimation of the effect size and 
the evidence for EC in these three attributions (see below). Unexpectedly, there was no 
evidence for an EC effect in the evaluation attribution and valence identification accuracy was 
at chance.  
As in Experiment 1, the EC effects found overall and in the memory attribution were 
accompanied by above chance US valence identification and additional analyses revealed that 
the general EC effect was moderated by US valence identification. These results are 
consistent with the view that knowledge about US valence may underlie EC. However, we 
also found substantial evidence for an EC effect in the random attribution while US valence 
identification was at chance.  This suggests that EC might also occur in the absence of any 
structural knowledge. This could reflect the fact that attitude learning may occur in the 
absence of learning of the pairings structure. A mechanism that could explain this kind of 
attitude learning is the implicit misattribution of affect (Jones, Fazio & Olson, 2009). 
According to this view affective reactions evoked by US could be misattributed to CS during 
the conditioning procedure. In this case, it would be unnecessary to acquire any knowledge 
about the pairings to be influenced by an EC procedure.  
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As we did not obtain any EC effect and the valence identification accuracy was at 
chance in the evaluation attribution, it seems that attitudes did not contribute to valence 
identification. Hütter and Sweldens (2013) provided evidence that attitudes toward CS may 
help to identify US valence even in the absence of genuine memory. It seems that, as in 
Mierop et al. (2017), this was not the case here. One difference between the two studies was 
that contrary to Hütter and Sweldens (2013), we did not explicitly instruct participants to 
respond to the US valence identification questions on the basis of their attitudes.  
Contrary to Experiment 1, there was not evidence for a reversed EC effect when 
participants indicated the opposite US valence in the first session of Experiment 2. In this last 
experiment, attitudes and the ability to identify US valence were measured in two different 
blocks. It seems that, as expected, this modification of the procedure reduced the tendency to 
rely on attitudes to respond to valence identification questions and thereby prevented this 
reversed EC effect from occurring. This interpretation is congruent with the fact that EC was 
obtained in the random attribution while valence identification accuracy was at chance. 
Indeed, relying on their attitudes would have allowed participants to identify US valence 
above chance level.   
Finally, the results of the second phase of the experiment support the hypothesis that 
EC is quite robust over time. Indeed, the EC effects found in the first phase were still present 
24 hours later. A delay of 24 hours may not have been long enough.  However, as expected, 
the number of memory attributions decreased which suggests that while EC was still present 
after a 24 hours delay it was less sustained by conscious knowledge.  
Meta-analysis of Experiments 1 and 2 
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We conducted further analyses across Experiment 1 and the first session of 
Experiment 2 by computing meta-analytical B (Dienes, 2014). In addition, for each EC effect 
we report, in Table 3, the mean difference between attitude change for positively and 
negatively paired CS (Dienes, 2014) and a Cohen’s d (Cumming, 2012) with 95% confidence 
intervals (CIs) around each of them (Algina & Keselman, 2003). The former is a raw effect 
size while the latter is a standardized effect size. The fact that the 95% CI excludes zero 
indicates that the effect is significant in the frequentist approach. 
US valence identification 
There was decisive evidence that the overall proportion of correct US valence 
identification was above chance across experiments, BH(0, 15% above H0) =  6.04 × 10
37, Rob. Reg. 
[0.062, >100%]. There was also decisive evidence for above chance performance in the 
memory attribution, BH(0, 15% above H0) =  9.55 × 10
83, Rob. Reg. [0.076, >100%], and strong 
evidence in the feeling-based attribution, BH(0, 15% above H0) =  96.3, Rob. Reg. [0.40, >100%]. 
By contrast, there was substantial evidence for chance performance in the random attribution, 
BH(0, 15% above H0) =  .108, Rob. Reg. [4.47, ∞]. 
EC effects 
Across experiments, there was decisive evidence for an overall EC effect which was of 
medium size, BH1(0, 23.5) = 1.31 × 10
9, Rob. Reg. [0.33, >400] (see Table 3). This is congruent 
with previous studies as a meta-analysis indicated that the average effect size of EC is d = .52 
(Hofmann et al., 2010). In the memory attribution, there was also decisive evidence for an EC 
effect which was of medium size as well, BH1(0, 23.5) = 9.80 × 10
7, Rob. Reg. [0.79, >400]. In 
the feeling-based attribution, the evidence for an EC effect was substantial but it was of small 
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size, BH1(0, 23.5) = 3.27, Rob. Reg. [1.6, 25]. Similarly, in the random attribution there was 
strong evidence for an EC effect which was small, BH1(0, 23.5) = 20.52, Rob. Reg. [1.3, 175]. 
Next, we analysed EC effects for correct and incorrect US valence identifications. 
Among correct identifications, there was decisive evidence for an EC effect which was of 
medium size, BH1(0, 23.5) = 1.47 × 10
15, Rob. Reg. [0.43, >400]. Among incorrect 
identifications, there was strong evidence against a regular EC effect, BH1(0, 23.5) = 0.021, Rob. 
Reg. [1.3, ∞], and decisive evidence for a reversed effect which was of small size, BH2(0, 
23.5) = 3934, Rob. Reg. [0.65, >400].   
Table 3. Mean difference between attitude change for positively and negatively paired 
CS and Cohen’s d as a function of attribution type and of accuracy of US valence 
identification across Experiment 1 and 2. 
    
95 % CI for Mean 
difference   




difference LL UL 
Cohen'
s d LL UL 
General EC effect 13.92 9.86 17.98 0.56 0.39 0.74 
Memory 28.97 19.93 38.00 0.54 0.36 0.72 
Feeling-based 6.22 0.95 11.50 0.20 0.03 0.36 
Random 9.47 3.17 15.77 0.26 0.09 0.43 
Correct US valence 
identification 
28.93 22.27 35.58 0.72 0.53 0.90 
Incorrect US valence 
identification 
-11.44 -16.52 -6.37 -0.37 -0.54 -0.20 
Note. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. LL and UL represent the lower 
and the upper limit of the confidence interval respectively. An EC effect is significant in the 




 We conducted two studies that distinguished between the ability to identify US 
valence and higher order awareness (i.e., the awareness of knowing) of associations between 
CS and US valence. One important contribution of these studies was thus to clarify the role of 
awareness at the objective and subjective threshold. The results were generally in line with the 
prediction that ability to identify US valence (i.e., awareness at the objective threshold) is 
required for EC to occur, except for the random attribution. However, a key finding of the 
meta-analysis of the studies was that US identification may be based on either conscious or 
unconscious structural knowledge as evidenced by EC effect found not only for the memory 
attribution but also for the feeling-based attribution. Another important finding of the meta-
analysis was that EC was found when participants made a random attribution. In this case, 
contrary to memory and feeling-based attributions, they performed at chance at the valence 
identification test. Hence EC can also occur in the absence of any kind of knowledge about 
US valence, at least at the time of testing. In making this claim, we take knowledge to be that 
which allows discriminative responding. In any case, those results suggest that, at the 
subjective threshold, awareness is not required for EC to occur. The meta-analysis also 
suggests that while conscious knowledge leads to medium EC effects, unconscious 
knowledge gives rise to small EC effects. Similarly, EC effects occurring in the absence of 
any knowledge were also of small magnitude. This is congruent with previous finding that 
awareness is an important moderator of EC (Hofmann et al., 2010). We will first discuss the 
implications of our findings regarding the conscious status of structural knowledge and for the 
main models of attitude acquisition through EC. We will then discuss the advantages and 
limitations of subjective measures of awareness and the potential of knowledge attributions 
for future research in EC.  
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Conscious and unconscious knowledge in EC 
In a typical EC experiment, participants are incidentally exposed to pairs of stimuli 
composed of an initially neutral CS and a valent US. As a result, they acquire some 
knowledge about the structure of the material (i.e., the CS-US pairings) and their attitudes 
towards CS change in the direction of US valence. Beyond the debate about the learning 
mechanisms that lead to the acquisition of conditioned attitudes, the main contributions of our 
studies are to bring to light the distinction between conscious and unconscious knowledge in 
EC and to propose a new method based on subjective measures of awareness.   
Our results replicate previous findings (Pleyers et al., 2007; 2009) showing that correct 
valence identification is necessary for EC to occur.  However, contrary to previous studies, we 
do not assume that there is a perfect overlap between performance and awareness. Hence, we 
do not interpret this finding as evidence that participants who correctly identified US valence 
were necessarily aware of the knowledge.  By higher order theories of consciousness 
(Rosenthal, 2005; Michel et al., 2018), discrimination is based on first-order knowledge 
whereas awareness of structural knowledge requires a second order state, with content that 
one has that structural knowledge.  Hence, we interpret above chance US valence 
identification in a forced choice task (i.e., objective measure) as evidence that participants 
have some knowledge. In order to measure awareness of knowing we relied on a subjective 
measure, the structural knowledge attributions. Across studies, an EC effect and above chance 
US valence identification were found in the memory and feeling-based attributions. While 
participants reported being aware of their structural knowledge in the former attribution they 
reported being unaware in the latter. This finding provides evidence that both conscious and 
unconscious knowledge may underlie EC.  
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The same type of results has recently been obtained in a related paradigm (Jurchiș, 
Costea, Dienes, Miclea, & Opre, 2020). In this study, strings from a first artificial grammar 
were positively conditioned and strings from a second grammar were negatively conditioned. 
Consequently, new strings from the first grammar were preferred over new strings from the 
second grammar. This result was obtained for the strings for which participants reported that 
they knew why they liked them but also when they reported that they didn’t know why. 
Congruently, our results in the memory and feeling-based attributions showed that 
participants may acquire knowledge that they are aware of as well as knowledge that they are 
not aware of in a classical EC paradigm. 
However, contrary to our initial hypotheses, the meta-analysis revealed that in the 
random attribution participants did not acquire any knowledge about the pairings but were 
nevertheless conditioned. This finding provides first evidence that EC may occur even when 
US valence identification is perfectly at chance. Interestingly, this phenomenon appears to be 
limited to trials in which the participants believe they had no idea of the valence of the US. As 
discussed above implicit misattribution of affects could explain this EC effect obtained in the 
absence of any knowledge.  
Implications for models of attitude learning through EC  
 The main goal of our experiments was to measure the awareness of knowing at the 
time of testing. Hence, we did not implement any manipulation of awareness during the 
conditioning phase which would have been the most direct way to study the learning 
mechanisms that lead to the acquisition of conditioned attitudes (Gawronski & Walther, 
2012).  However, some previous studies suggest that conscious and unconscious knowledge 
measured via structural knowledge attributions could be acquired through qualitatively 
different learning mechanisms (Dienes, 2012, for a review). We thus discuss whether the 
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learning mechanisms proposed by the main models of attitude learning through EC could lead 
to the acquisition of conscious and unconscious knowledge. 
As recent studies using item-level analyses found EC effects only in CS for which the 
paired US or its valence was correctly identified (e.g., Pleyers et al., 2007), the propositional 
account of EC has become more prominent (Mitchell, De Houwer, & Lovibond, 2009; but see 
McLaren, Forrest, McLaren, Jones, Aitken, & Mackintosh,  2014). According to this view, 
controlled reasoning processes are necessary for learning to take place and EC requires 
forming conscious propositions about the relation between CS and US. Our data support the 
existence of a propositional learning mechanism. In our view, this mechanism best explains 
the EC effect found in the memory attribution as participants indeed reported conscious 
propositions about the pairings by responding to the attribution question. Moreover, the fact 
that the EC effect was larger in the memory attribution, in which the proportion of correct 
valence identification was the highest, than in other attributions is congruent with the 
propositional account. The propositional account could arguably explain the EC effect 
obtained in the feeling-based attribution because the percentage of correct valence 
identification was above chance level for those trials and feelings or intuitions reported by 
participants might be construed as propositions. By contrast, the EC effect obtained in the 
random attribution, while US valence identification accuracy was at chance, challenge the 
propositional account. According to this view, EC should not occur in the absence of 
awareness. One might still argue that participants were aware of the pairings during the 
conditioning phase and that we did not detect awareness because it was measured at the time 
of testing.  Hence, participants could have forgotten the associations. However, in Experiment 
2, the percentage of correct US valence identifications did not decrease 24 hours after the 
conditioning phase and there was only a few minutes between conditioning and testing 
phases. In addition, liking ratings were obtained at the time of testing.  
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A mechanism that is susceptible to produce EC in the absence of awareness is implicit 
misattribution of affects. According to the implicit misattribution account, affective reactions 
evoked by US could be implicitly misattributed to CS during the conditioning procedure and 
thereby modify the representation of the CS in memory. As a result, EC could occur without 
acquiring any knowledge about the CS-US pairings. The implicit misattribution mechanism 
might also explain the EC effect as well as the slightly above chance performance obtained at 
the valence identification test in the feeling-based attribution (at least in Experiment 1) 
because conditioned attitude might influence responses during this test (Hütter & Sweldens, 
2013).  
Finally, conditioned attitude could also be formed through automatically operating 
association formation processes leading to unconscious associations between CS and US 
representations (e.g., Baeyens, Eelen, Crombez, & Van den Bergh, 1992). By higher order 
theories, this type of mechanism explains the result obtained in the feeling–based attribution 
well as unconscious knowledge should allow US valence identification and leads to EC.  
To sum up, the EC effect obtained in the memory attribution is best explained by the 
propositional account. The EC effect obtained in the feeling-based attribution is arguably 
compatible with the different theoretical accounts mentioned above while the effect obtained 
in the random attribution is best explained by implicit misattribution of affects. Our results are 
thus congruent with the view that several mechanisms may underlie EC in the very same task 
(De Houwer, 2007, see also, Jacoby, 1991).  
Advantages and limitations of subjective measures of awareness  
There is currently no better way to find out the content of a person’s awareness than to 
ask her to produce a report about it (e.g. Rosenthal, 2019).  In this view, subjective measures 
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are the most direct method to measure awareness of knowing (Timmermans & Cleeremans, 
2015). However, designing reliable and sensitive subjective measures may be challenging. 
In the field of EC, the vast majority of studies that used subjective measures to assess 
knowledge about CS-US pairings relied on general open-ended questions. They have been 
criticized for their lack of sensitivity as participants may underreport awareness (Sweldens et 
al., 2014). A few recent studies relied on confidence ratings (Bar-Anan et al., 2010; Bar-
Anan, & Amzaleg-David, 2014). The use of these scales is an improvement as it has been 
showed, in other incidental learning paradigms, that they are more sensitive measures of 
awareness than free reports (Ziori & Dienes, 2006; see also Wierzchoń et al., 2014). The 
current experiments go beyond this prior work because the use of structural knowledge 
attributions allowed us to measure the conscious status of structural knowledge while 
confidence ratings only measure the conscious status of judgement knowledge (Dienes & 
Scott, 2005). For example, one may be unaware of the basis of a response (i.e., structural 
knowledge) and have a sense of the accuracy of that response (i.e., some confidence).  
Another contribution of Bar-Anan and colleagues’ studies has been to show that 
valence identification measures could be influenced by pre-existing attitudes. We conducted 
additional analyses to check if it was the case here and found a very weak correlation and no 
evidence one way or the other for pre-existing attitudes being related to valence identification 
across experiments1 (r(143) = .14, BF= 0.91, Rob. Reg. [0, 0.99]). Additionally, in Bar-Anan 
and colleagues’ studies, valence identification responses to CS with more extreme attitudes 
were made with more confidence. Across the current experiments, we again found a very 
weak correlation and no evidence either way for pre-existing attitudes being linked to 
knowledge attributions4 (r(143) = .148, BF = 1.32, Rob. Reg. [0, 1]). It is also possible that 
conditioned attitudes influence valence identification which could lead to overestimate 
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genuine knowledge. The inclusion of an evaluation attribution in Experiment 2 allowed us to 
examine whether participants used their attitudes deliberately as a cue to respond to valence 
identification questions. Among those trials, participants performed at chance at the valence 
identification task.  It is still possible that participants have relied on their conditioned 
attitudes (without noticing it) in other attributions which might have contributed to valence 
identification.  In this case, unaware EC (at the objective threshold) might be underestimated. 
More generally, as stated above, designing reliable and sensitive subjective measures 
may be challenging.  Hence, our knowledge attribution question was designed to increase 
reliability and sensitivity. Assessing awareness retrospectively (e.g., with an open-ended 
question at the end of the experiment) could constitute a first potential problem. To avoid any 
forgetting, we measured awareness of knowing on a trial-by-trial basis. Moreover, each 
attribution immediately followed the valence identification question that itself immediately 
followed attitude measurement in Experiment 1. Critics of subjective measures may still argue 
that participants’ reports reflect their biases to respond conservatively (i.e., they may fail to 
disclose their knowledge unless they feel confident enough). For example, if a free recall is 
requested, participants could choose not to report some knowledge in which they have a low 
confidence. This problem is ameliorated when using knowledge attributions because 
participants are not asked to state the content of their conscious knowledge but only whether 
they have some conscious knowledge (Dienes, 2012). Additionally, attributions were related 
to valence identification. In particular, participants who reported responding randomly were 
actually at chance at the valence identification. This ensures that they did not use the random 
attribution while having some conscious knowledge. Metacognitive judgements about 
participants’ awareness of knowing also seems pretty accurate in the memory attribution, 
where the percentage of correct valence identifications was systematically about 80%, and in 
the feeling–based attribution in which it was slightly above chance. See Dienes and Seth 
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(2010b), Dienes (2004, 2012), Dienes and Perner (2004) and Timmermans and Cleeremans 
(2014) for further discussion on establishing the validity of subjective measures. 
Avenues for future research 
At least two avenues for future research could be built upon the distinction between 
conscious and unconscious knowledge in EC. The first would be to explore the relation 
between learning mechanisms occurring during the exposition to CS-US pairings and the 
conscious status of the acquired structural knowledge.  This could be done by implementing 
manipulations of awareness during the encoding of the pairings. In the field of implicit 
learning, some studies show that performing a concurrent task during the learning phase 
impairs the acquisition of conscious but not of unconscious structural knowledge (Dienes, 
2007; Dienes & Scott, 2005). It would be interesting to test whether the same pattern of 
results would be obtained in the EC paradigm. 
The second research avenue would be to examine the links between the controllability 
of EC and the conscious status of structural knowledge. The controllability question has 
recently been investigated in a couple of studies showing that while the acquisition of 
conditioned attitudes is partially uncontrollable (Hütter & Sweldens, 2018), the explicit 
expression of these attitudes is controllable (Balas & Gawronski, 2012; Gawronski, Balas, & 
Creighton, 2014). In light of these studies, it would be interesting to examine the interplay 
between  an instruction to control the impact of the pairings (Balas & Gawronski, 2012; 
Gawronski et al., 2014; Hu, Gawronski & Balas, 2017a ) or information about the relationship 





We developed an innovative method based on subjective measures of awareness 
motivated by higher order and integration theories of consciousness. This new method 
allowed us to test not only whether correct US valence identification is necessary for EC to 
occur but also for awareness of knowing. Making these distinctions helped us to bring new 
light on the highly debated question of the role of awareness in EC. Our results provide 
evidence for three types of EC within the same task, each with a distinct phenomenology. The 
first is underpinned by conscious knowledge, the second by unconscious knowledge and the 
third occur in the absence of any knowledge about US valence. 
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1. Previous studies found an average correlation of r =.33 between preexisting attitudes 
and valence identification (Bar-Anan et al., 2010). We used a normal distribution with 
an SD of z = 0.343 as a prior. 
2. As Bayes factors provide continuous degree of support and given the high prior 
probability that there is an effect we interpreted the B of 2.98 as substantial evidence 
for EC. 
3. As there are four options, the average frequency for each attribution is 25% or 10 
responses out of 40. Thus, the most this average number can decrease is by 10; hence 
we used an SD of max/2 = 5 responses. For simplicity we used the same amount for 
predicting increases in the implicit attributions. 
4. Similarly to Bar-Anan and colleagues, we tested whether attitude extremity (i.e., the 
distance between the evaluation and the midpoint of the evaluation scale) was related 
to an index of attribution type (1 = memory, 2 = feeling-based or evaluation, 3 = 
random). Previous studies found an average correlation of r =.24 between attitude 
extremity and confidence (Bar-Anan et al., 2010). We used a normal distribution with 
an SD of z = 0.245 as a prior. 
 
 
 
